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tion. In Mapp v. Ohio45 the only evidence leading to defendant's conviction
was that which was illegally obtained, thereby resulting in a miscarriage of
justice. California, in similar cases, 46 has supported this decision. The effect
of Article VI, section 4 of the California Constitution is that if there is
evidence, entirely independent of that illegally obtained, that convincingly, if
not overwhelmingly, establishes guilt, the conviction should be affirmed.47 It,
therefore, would appear that the California provision does not conflict with the
United States Supreme Court decision in the Mapp case.
Conclusion
Recent decisions in California have analyzed the problem and have limited
the power of search, indicating that when the traffic violation is serious enough
there may be reason to believe there are additional circumstances which would
give rise to a reasonable search. It does not seem unreasonable that an officer
should have some justification for search. The primary purpose of the constitu-
tional guarantees relating to searches and seizures is to prevent unreasonable
invasions of the privacy of the people. Therefore, in the area of traffic viola-
tions a balance between effective law enforcement and the protection of consti-
tutional rights to which all citizens are entitled must be made. "[T]he constitu-
tional provisions make no distinction between the guilty and the innocent and
it would be manifestly impossible to protect the rights of the innocent if the
police were permitted to justify unreasonable searches and seizures on the ground




" People v. Gale, 46 Cal. 2d 253, 294 P.2d 13 (1956) ; People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434,
282 P.2d 905 (1955).
People v. Tarantino, 45 Cal. 2d 590, 290 P.2d 505 (1955).
People v. Cahan, 44 Cal. 2d 434, 439, 292 P.2d 905, 910 (1955).
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RIGHT OF WAY STATUTES
The "rules of the road" are criminal statutes. There is no provision in the
California Vehicle Code for civil liability based on violations of traffic control
regulations.' It is California law, however, that these statutes are the standards
by which to judge the conduct of the parties in civil actions.2 Cases treating
' To the contrary, the 1935 Vehicle Code contained a provision that "[n]o record of the
conviction of any person for any violation of this code . . . shall be admissible as evidence
in any court in any civil action." This provision was repealed by Cal. Stat. 1957, c. 1956 § 1,
p. 3497, but the courts continue to exclude admission of conviction of traffic violations in
civil actions. Mooren v. King, 182 Cal. App. 2d 546, 6 Cal. Rptr. 362 (1960).
2 Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947). This
position has not been accepted by all courts. See Eisenhuth v. Moneyhon, 161 Ohio St. 367,
372-73, 53 Ohio Op. 274, 277, 119 N.E.2d 440, 443 (1954), where the court said: "When such
standard of conduct is so fixed [by legislative enactment], it is final and conclusive except
in cases where the enactment is so vague or so dependent upon a variety of facts and circum-
stances as to require definition by a court or jury before it may be applied to the facts of a
particular case .... However, a legislative enactment which does not purport to define a
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the duty of a motorist entering a highway8 from a private drive indicate a
failure to apply the statutory standard intended by the legislature.
Section 21804 of the vehicle code4 states that a motorist entering a highway
from a private drive must yield the right of way5 to all vehicles approaching
upon the highway. It was decided early, in Wakefield v. Horn,6 that a literal
interpretation of the statute would be unreasonable; for it would require the
motorist not to enter from a private drive whenever there was a vehicle approach-
ing on the public way, irrespective of the distance. Therefore, the court
reasoned, the legislature must have meant that no motorist could enter a high-
way from a private road while a vehicle was approaching so near as to consti-
tute an immediate hazard.
7
The driver entering a public way from a private drive is confronted with
a situation similar to that faced by the driver entering from a stop street. His
duty has also been prescribed by the legislature.8 Section 21802 of the vehicle
code states that a motorist entering a through highway9 must stop and yield the
right of way to all vehicles approaching so close as to constitute an immediate
hazard, and that, having yielded, he obtains the right of way over all other
vehicles approaching on the through highway. The courts have not thought
that a literal interpretation of this statute would be unreasonable. It is the
duty of a motorist approaching a through street to stop and not to enter while
a vehicle is approaching so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.10
civil liability but merely makes provision to secure the safety or welfare of the public is not
to be construed as establishing such a liability. In such cases, no standard of care other
than the common law standard of due care under the circumstances is fixed by the enact-
ment, and the standard of due care is that exercised by a reasonably prudent person under
the circumstances of the particular case." The court concluded that the traffic regulation
requiring a motorist to give a signal before turning his vehicle was of the latter type of
legislative enactment. See also the dissenting opinion of Justice Carter in Satterlee 29
Cal.2d at 601, 177 P.2d at 290.
'CAL. VE-H. CODE § 360: "'Highway' is a way or place of whatever nature, publicly
maintained and open to the use of the public for purposes of vehicular travel. Highway
includes street."
'CAL. VEH. CODE: § 21804: "The driver of a vehicle about to enter or cross a highway
from any private property, or private road or driveway or from an alley not exceeding a
width of 22 feet or from any alley as may be defined by local ordinance shall yield the right-
of-way to all vehicles approaching on the highway."
'CAL. VEH. CODE: § 525: "'Right-of-way' is the privilege of the immediate use of the
highway."
8109 Cal. App. 325, 293 Pac. 97 (1930).
Id. at 327, 293 Pac. at 98.
' CAL. VEH. CODE § 21802: "(a) The driver of any vehicle shall stop at the entrance to
a through highway and shall yield the right-of-way to other vehicles which have entered the
intersection from the through highway or which are approaching so closely on the through
highway as to constitute an immediate hazard. (b) A driver having so yielded may proceed
and the drivers of all other vehicles approaching the intersection on the through highway
shall yield the right-of-way to the vehicle so about to enter or cross the through highway... .'
9 CAL VEr. CODE § 600: "A 'through highway' is a highway or portion thereof at the
entrance to which stop signs have been erected and vehicular traffic from intersecting high-
ways is required by law to stop before entering or crossing the same."1* Grasso v. Cunial, 106 Cal. App. 2d 294,235 P.2d 32 (1951).
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Reciprocally, it is the duty of the driver on the through street to yield the right
of way to a vehicle entering from a stop street, if his vehicle does not consti-
tute an immediate hazard when the latter enters. 1
That a literal interpretation of section 21802 has been deemed reasonable
prompts an inquiry to determine what a literal interpretation of section 21804
would mean. Since right of way is "the privilege of the immediate use of the
highway,"' 2 questions of right of way arise only where there is danger of a
collision if the motorists involved continue on their respective paths without
delay.13 Clearly, there can be no violation of a right of way statute if no ques-
tion of right of way is involved. Equally clearly, the mere fact that a vehicle
is approaching on the public way does not mean that there is danger of a colli-
sion if a motorist enters from a private drive. A truly literal interpretation of
section 21804, then, would require a motorist not to enter a highway from a
private road while there is danger of a collision. This should be contrasted
with the "immediate hazard" test of Wakefield,14 which implies probability of
collision,' 5 i.e., something more than mere danger, and is therefore less strict
when applied to the motorist entering from a private road.
The cases treating section 21804 reflect the influence of the language in
Wakefield to the effect that a literal interpretation of the statute would be
unreasonable. In McDougall v. Morrison16 the court said that it is the duty
of the driver of an automobile entering a public way from a private drive not
to proceed if a car is approaching on the highway unless he believes, as a reason-
ably prudent and cautious person, that he can pass in front of the other car
in safety.' 7 The court cited only Wakefield as authority for the rule; and since
an immediate hazard exists when a reasonably prudent person would apprehend
the probability of a collision were he to continue on his intended course,' 8 the
statement of duty in McDougall seems to be equivalent to that in Wakefield.
Nevertheless, formulation of a duty as that of "a reasonably prudent and
cautious person" marks a major departure from the terms of a statute which
on its face imposes an absolute duty to yield.
Section 21804 received a slightly different treatment in Todd v. Standfield.19
The trial court instructed as follows: "If you find from the evidence in this
case that the defendant Standfield drove his vehicle from a private driveway
onto a public highway at a time when the plaintiff's vehicle was sufficiently
" Graf v. Garcia, 117 Cal. App. 2d 792, 256 P.2d 995 (1953).
" CAL. VEH. CODE § 525.
" People v. McLachlan, 36 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 754, 93 P.2d 280 (App. Dept., Super. Ct.,
Los Angeles, 1939).
" See note 7 supra.
" See Washam v. Peerless Automatic Staple Mach. Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 174, 113 P.2d
724 (1941).
" 55 Cal. App. 2d 92, 130 P.2d 149 (1942).
17 Id. at 96, 130 P.2d at 151. This language first appears in Kemmish v. McCoid, 193
Iowa 958, 964, 185 N.W. 628, 630 (1922), where the court defined the duty of a driver
entering a highway from a private drive according to common law principles; there being
no statute applicable at the time.
" See Washam v. Peerless Automatic Staple Mach. Co., 45 Cal. App. 2d 174, 113 P.2d
724 (1941).
" 111 Cal. App. 2d 615, 245 P.2d 331 (1952).
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distant from the intersection as not to constitute an immediate hazard, then I
instruct you that the defendant Standfield had the right of way and it was the
duty of the plaintiff under such circumstances to yield the right of way to said
defendant and to slow down and stop, if necessary, in order to avoid a colli-
sion"20 (italics added). Since the verdict was for the plaintiff, there was no
objection to the instruction on appeal. The court said merely that the instruc-
tion given sufficiently covered another instruction requested by the defendant
but refused by the trial court.21 Nevertheless, the court in PandelI v. Hischier
22
construed the language in Todd to express approval of the instruction. In pass-
ing upon the refusal to give an instruction substantially the same as that given
in Todd, the court in Pandell said: "The proffered instruction undoubtedly
states a correct principle of law,'" 23 and cited Todd as authority.
The ruling in Pandell marks the culmination of a series of successively more
liberal interpretations of 21804, beginning with Wakefield. The result is that
it is the duty of a driver on a public way to yield the right of way to a driver
entering from a private road, if his vehicle does not constitute an immediate
hazard when the latter enters,2 4 despite the omission from 21804 of any provi-
sion to that effect. The courts have construed the section to mean that the
duty of the motorist entering a through street from a private drive is the same
as that of the motorist entering from a stop street.25 Reciprocally, the duty of
a motorist on a public way approaching a private drive is the same as that of a
motorist approaching a stop street.
26
The primary consideration in statutory construction is to give effect to
legislative intent.27 One of the principles by which legislative intent is deter-
mined is the maxim that where a provision included in one statute is omitted
from another statute relating to a similar subject, the intention behind the
statutes is not the same unless no other interpretation would be reasonable.28
A true literal interpretation of 21804 would require the motorist entering from
a private drive to yield only when there is danger of a collision, which does not
seem unreasonable.2 9 It follows from the rule of statutory construction that
the legislature probably did not intend that the duty of the driver entering a
through highway from a private drive be the same as that of the driver entering
from a stop street. It appears that the intent was to impose greater care upon
the motorist emerging from private property.
20 Id. at 617-18, 245 P.2d at 333.
'2 Id. at 618, 245 P.2d at 333.
*' 166 Cal. App. 2d 693, 333 P.2d 762 (1958).
23 Id. at 695, 333 P.2d at 763.
"-'Ibid; see also Neyens v. Selnow, 21 Cal. Rptr. 151 (1962).
"Compare McDougall v. Morrison, 55 Cal. App. 2d 92, 130 P.2d 149 (1942) with
Grasso v. Cunial, 106 Cal. App. 2d 294, 235 P.2d 32 (1951).
"Compare Pandell v. Hischier, 166 Cal. App. 2d 693, 333 P.2d 762 (1958) with Graf v.
Garcia, 117 Cal. App. 2d 792, 256 P.2d 995 (1953).
7 California Toll Bridge Authority v. Kuchel, 40 Cal. 2d 43, 251 P.2d 4 (1952) ; Dickey
v. Raisin Proration Zone, 24 Cal. 2d 796, 151 P.2d 505, 157 A.L.R.2d 324 (1944), cert. denied
324 U.S. 869 (1945).
" People v. Valentine, 28 Cal. 2d 121, 169 P.2d 1 (1946).
" An Ohio statute, Ouio REv. CooE, § 4511.44 (1953), similar to CAL. VEH. CODE § 21804,
has been interpreted literally to confer an absolute right of way upon the vehicle on the
highway. Beers v. Wills, 172 Ohio St. 569, 18 Ohio Op. 2d 128, 179 N.E.2d 57 (1962).
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That this should be so follows from the purpose implicit in traffic regula-
tions, i.e., rules of conduct to promote the orderly and safe flow of traffic.30 If
safety were the only consideration, no motorist would be allowed to enter a
highway, from either a private drive or a stop street, whenever there was any
possibility of a collision. In the case of the stop street, such a rule would defeat
the other purpose of traffic regulations, promotion of the orderly flow of traffic,
since it would unduly restrict traffic movement on the stop street.
On the other hand, the intermittent traffic entering the highway from private
property would not be unreasonably obstructed by allowing precedence to
vehicles on the highway.3 1 But it can be argued that requiring the highway
driver to be prepared to yield to traffic emerging from private property would
unreasonably obstruct traffic on the highway. In fact, awarding the motorist on
the public way an absolute right of way over the vehicle entering from private
property would decrease the danger of collision, and thus promote an orderly,
as well as safe, flow of traffic.
In California, violation of a statute designed to protect against a certain
kind of harm creates a presumption of negligence on the part of the person
guilty of the violation.3 2 This presumption may be rebutted by proof that the
conduct of the party who violated the statute was that which might be expected
of a reasonable man of ordinary prudence desiring to comply with the law,
acting under similar circumstances. 3 3 The effect of the presumption is to relieve
the party desiring to prove negligence from the burden of proving that the
party who violated the statute failed to act as a reasonably prudent man. The
burden of going forward is cast upon the party guilty of the violation to present
evidence justifying an excuse for violation.
3 4
There is an inconsistency between the "rebuttable presumption of negligence"
rule and the courts' construction of section 21804. This is illustrated by
McAllister v. Cummings,35 where the decisive issue was the duty of a motorist
entering a highway from a private drive. Plaintiff was a motorcycle policeman
traveling eastward in the inside lane of a four lane highway. Defendant motorist
entered the highway from a private drive intending to turn left and proceed
westward on the highway. The vehicles collided and plaintiff suffered severe
injuries. At plaintiff's request the jury was instructed in the language of section
21804 that it is the duty of a driver about to enter a highway from a private
drive to yield the right of way to all vehicles approaching on the highway.
They were also instructed that the violation of a statute raises a presumption
of negligence which may be rebutted by evidence showing that, under the cir-
cumstanccs, the conduct of the party who violated the statute was excusable or
"o Dembicer v. Pawtucket Cabinet & Builders Finish Co., 58 R.I. 451, 193 Atl. 622 (1937).
" See Uhl v. Fertig, 56 Cal. App. 718, 725, 206 Pac. 467, 469 (1922), where the court
said, "The casual machine that might emerge upon the highway from private property
aligning the same could better suffer the small delay by allowing precedence to the highway
traffic, and so not only avoid obstructing the latter, but decrease the danger of injury by
collision."
" Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 177 P.2d 279 (1947).
" Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal. 2d 474, 218 P.2d 531 (1950).
" Satterlee v. Orange Glenn School Dist., 29 Cal. 2d 581, 592-93, 177 P.2d 279, 285
(1947).
" 191 Cal. App. 2d 1, 12 Cal. Rptr. 418 (1961).
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justifiable; and that excusable or justifiable conduct would be that which might
be expected of a person of ordinary prudence who desired to comply with the
law, but acting under given circumstances. The verdict was for the plaintiff,
necessarily implying a finding that he was not guilty of contributory negligence.
On appeal it was ruled error to refuse defendant's qualifying instruction that it
is the duty of an automobile driver entering a highway from a private driveway
not to enter if a car is coming unless he believes, as a reasonably prudent and
cautious person, that he can pass in front of the other car in safety.
Defendant's instruction was correct on the authority of Wakefield v. Horn 6
and McDougall v. Morrison.37 But by approving the instruction the court denied
the plaintiff even the possibility of the benefit of the presumption of negligence
which arises upon violation of a statute. In order to raise the presumption under
the ruling of McAllister, the plaintiff must show that the defendant failed to
act as a reasonably prudent man. If the plaintiff so proves, he has proved the
negligence of the defendant, and the presumption of negligence is superfluous.
If the statutory duty of the defendant in McAllister were to yield the right
of way to all vehicles approaching on the highway, the result would be quite
different. While operating his vehicle lawfully upon the highway, the plaintiff
collided with the defendant who was entering from a private drive. His failure
to yield the right of way would establish defendant's violation of the statute
and thereby raise a presumption that he was negligent. The burden of going
forward would be shifted to the defendant to show that his conduct was that
of a reasonably prudent man, notwithstanding his violation of the statute.
Although a truly literal interpretation of section 21804 would confer an
absolute right of way upon the highway driver, it does not follow that the
motorist entering from the private drive would be held strictly liable for a
collision. His breach of duty to yield might be excusable or justifiable so that
his conduct would not be negligent.3 8 Such circumstances have arisen where the
motorist entered the public way from a blind road,3 9 or on a foggy and rainy
night.40 The driver on the highway might himself be guilty of negligence,
precluding recovery by either party.41 If the highway driver were guilty of
gross negligence or wilful disregard of the consequences of his actions, the
driver emerging from the private road would recover despite his own negligent
violation of the statute.4 2 It is difficult to see how a true literal interpretation
of the statute would work an injustice upon the unfavored driver.
M. Armon Cooper*
'o 109 Cal. App. 325, 293 Pac. 97 (1930).
87 55 Cal. App. 2d 92, 130 P.2d 149 (1942).
" See Ornales v. Wigger, 35 Cal. 2d 474, 218 P.2d 531 (1950) ; PRossER, TORTS, § 34
(2nd ed. 1955).
'0 Armstrong v. Studer, 2 Cal. App. 2d 166, 37 P.2d 475 (1934).
toDickison v. La Thorpe, 124 Cal. App. 2d 190, 268 P.2d 164 (1954).
"Hackey v. Luckehe, 19 Cal. App. 2d 130, 65 P.2d 77 (1937) ; PRossER, ToRTs, § 51
(2nd ed. 1955).
"See Alabam Freight Lines v. Phoenix Bakery, 64 Ariz. 101, 166 P.2d 816 (1946);
PROSSER TORTS, § 51 (2nd ed. 1955).
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